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Abstract: This paper provides a consideration of the suitability of western models of 
corporate governance for implementation in developing Asian economies such as Thailand. 
The paper adopts a literature review as the research method. Definitions of corporate 
governance and the history and the nature of corporate governance around the world are 
summarised. The evidence from previous studies on the effects of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis and the relationship with corporate governance is considered. International models of 
corporate governance, agency theory and stakeholder theory are also reviewed. Lastly, the 
relevance of ownership structure and corporate governance are addressed. Overall, the review 
in this paper suggests that the Asian financial crisis of 1997 forced companies to improve 
corporate governance. Recommendations include that variables identified in the literature 
such as the roles of the board of directors, audit committee, shareholder rights, and disclosure 
and transparency should be monitored and controlled by regulation to achieve a satisfactory 
standard or benchmark for corporate governance when compared with western models. 
Key terms: Western models of corporate governance; Developing economies; Thailand; 
1997 Asian financial crisis; Agency theory; Stakeholder theory. 
Introduction and background 
Thailand faced a financial crisis in 1997 and the crisis has been attributed to poor corporate 
governance. The criticisms of corporate governance in Thailand are mainly in respect of the 
high concentration of ownership, excessive government intervention, an under-developed 
capital market and a weak legal and regulatory framework for investor protection. Alba, 
Clasessens and Djankov (1998) indicate that bank, finance and securities companies were not 
sufficiently cautious about their lending. The Bank of Thailand and the Securities Exchange 
of Thailand (SET) did not have measures on financial performance; and furthermore, auditors 
did not announce real information about the financial performance of businesses. 
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The Asian financial crisis in 1997 was a big event forcing Thai companies to improve their 
corporate governance practices. In Asia, corporate governance has gained greater distinction 
since the Asian financial crisis in 1997. It is claimed that better governance may result from 
improved internal corporate governance mechanisms and enhanced accounting, disclosure, 
and auditing standards (Limpaphayom & Connelly, 2004; Nam & Lum, 2005). In addition, 
these studies show that corporate governance benefits companies with respect to increased 
long-term investment and increased credibility. 
 
Thailand, like many other Asian countries, had poor corporate governance systems prior to 
the financial crisis in 1997, as its financial institutions and companies had previously been 
effectively protected from the operation of market discipline. Its corporate governance 
practices were characterised by ineffective boards of directors, weak internal controls, 
unreliable financial reporting, inadequate protection of minority shareholder rights, lack of 
adequate disclosure, poor audits, a general lack of enforcement to ensure regulatory 
compliance, and the dominance of family control over business operations was prevalent. 
Western style principles and models of corporate governance, developed by the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) have been proposed as preferred theoretical reporting models for 
Thailand. Some researchers have suggested a mixture of corporate governance models is 
appropriate for developing countries such as Thailand (Alba, Clasessens & Djankov, 1998; 
Keong, 2002; Khan, 2004). The SET and the Thai Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) have adopted several measures to improve the accountability of management to 
shareholders, to enhance transparency and disclosure, and to ensure fairness to all 
shareholders. They studied corporate governance practices in several developed markets and 
adopted the practices deemed suitable to the Thai culture. As a result, western models of 
corporate governance mechanisms have been applied in Thailand after the Asian financial 
crisis. 
On the grounds that Thailand is an Asian country with characteristics such as culture and 
styles of business operation that differ from western countries, variables affecting the 
successful implementation of corporate governance in Thailand may not be the same as those 
in western countries. In addition, Letza et al., (2004) indicate that corporate governance is 
completely changeable and transformable and there is no permanent or universal principle 
which covers all societies, cultures and business situations. Although there are many 
corporate governance models, researchers have concluded that each system has its own 
weaknesses; no perfect system exists that can be applied to all countries. 
This paper provides a consideration of the theoretical underpinning for amendments made to 
the western models of corporate governance for implementation in developing Asian nations 
such as Thailand. The structure of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section the 
research method applied in this paper is outlined. Definitions of corporate governance and the 
history and the nature of corporate governance around the world such as in the United States 
(US), the United Kingdom (UK), and Australia are summarised in the following section. The 
evidence from previous studies on the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 
relationship with corporate governance is then considered. International models of corporate 
governance, agency theory and stakeholder theory are also reviewed Then the relevance of 
 
 
ownership structure and corporate governance are addressed. A summary is provided in the 
final section. 
 
 
2.0  Research method 
The research approach adopted in this paper is a literature review. It commences with a 
thorough international search of pertinent literature. The reason for this is that numerous 
international studies have investigated various aspects of the implementation of corporate 
governance whereas there are only a small number of studies of corporate governance in 
Thailand where corporate governance is a relatively new phenomenon. The review in this 
paper draws on the knowledge base from several disciplines to build a view of the influences 
on corporate governance. 
3.0  Literature review 
The primary purpose in this section is to review the literature related to corporate governance. 
Good corporate governance is a source of competitive advantage and critical to economic and 
social progress (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000). This section consists of seven parts. First, 
definition of corporate governance; second, corporate governance around the world; third, 
corporate governance and the Asian financial crisis; fourth, international models; fifth, 
agency theory; sixth, stakeholder theory; and seventh, ownership structure. 
3.1  Definitions 
There is no universally agreed definition for what the term corporate governance means, 
although numerous definitions have been offered (Anandarajah, 2004). Several perspectives 
of corporate governance follow. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed a theory of the ownership structure of a firm. The 
basis for their analysis is the perspective that a corporation is:  
„a legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also 
characterised by the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash-flows of the 
organization which can generally be sold without the permission of the other contracting  
individuals‟ (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p.61). 
The central point in corporate governance of the firm was laid out by Berle and Means 
(1932). They observed that a consequence of the separation of ownership and management 
was ownership dispersion and that such dispersion made subsequent monitoring and 
discipline of management difficult. More recently Demb and Neubauer (1992) described 
corporate governance as the process by which corporations are made responsive to the rights 
and wishes of stakeholders. Monks and Minow (1996) defined corporate governance as the 
relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of 
corporations. Neubauer and Lank (1998) defined corporate governance as a system of 
structure and processes to direct and control corporations and to account for them. 
Corporate governance describes all the influences affecting the institutional processes, 
including those for appointing the controllers and regulators, involved in organising the 
production and sale of goods and services (Turnbull, 1997). Sir Adrian Cadbury stated that 
corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and social 
goals and between individual and communal goals (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000). The Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) defined corporate governance as the manner in which power is 
exercised in the management of a country‘s social and economic resources for development 
(Wescott, 2000). 
 
 
Iskander and Chamlou (2000) stated that corporate governance is important not only to attract 
long-term patient foreign capital, but more especially to broaden and deepen local capital 
markets by attracting local investors-individual and institutional. Nielsen (2000) stated that 
corporate governance is the system of rights, structures and control mechanisms established 
internally and externally over the management of a listed public limited liability company, 
with the objective of protecting the interests of the various stakeholders. Kidd and Richter 
(2003) argued that corporate governance is an indirect mechanism in reducing agency costs 
and transaction costs imposed by managers acting in their own interests at the expense of 
companies and shareholders. Solomon and Solomon (2004) suggested that corporate 
governance is the system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, 
which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act 
in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity. 
The OECD defined corporate governance as the system by which business corporations are 
directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights 
and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for 
making decisions on corporate affairs (Clarke, 2004). 
In Thailand, the National Corporate Governance Committee (NCGC) defined corporate 
governance as a system having a corporate control structure combining strong leadership and 
operations monitoring. Its purpose is to establish a transparent working environment and 
enhance the company's competitiveness. It also strives to preserve capital and increase 
shareholders' long-term value with the consideration of the business of ethics, stakeholders 
and social concerns factors, throughout the process (NCGC, 2005). 
3.2  Corporate governance around the world 
The first well-documented failure of governance was the South Sea Bubble in the 1700s, 
which revolutionised business laws and practices in England. In the US there was the stock 
market crash of 1929. There were other crises, such as the secondary banking crisis of the 
1970s in the UK and the US savings and loan debacle of the 1980s. In addition to crises, the 
history of corporate governance has also been punctuated by a series of well-known company 
failures: the Maxwell Group of newspapers; the collapse of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI); and Barings Bank. As a result, regulators have moved to 
improve the elements of corporate governance (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000). In the early 
1990s, research on corporate governance in countries other than the US began to appear. At 
first, the research focused on other major world economies, primarily Japan, Germany, and 
the UK (Denis & McConnell, 2002). 
 
United States of America 
In 1929, the Wall Street stock market crash occurred in the US. The stock market collapse 
revealed market manipulation, insider trading, general mismanagement and a reckless 
trampling of shareholder rights. As a result, the US Congress enacted the Securities Act 1933 
and the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 to address some of these abuses, primarily through 
the regulation of corporate financial disclosure to improve transparency. 
In the late 1980s, the response to governance failure in the US was similar to the response 
noted in the 1930s. The most recent round of reforms began as a result of takeovers and 
 
 
constituency statutes enacted under state laws. The major performance problems became 
evident in many of the largest corporations where reform began to focus more on the quality 
of corporate boards and their independence. An active group of institutional investors began 
to emerge (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000). 
In the US in 2001, corporate crises occurred at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco International, 
Adeplhia Communications, Global Crossing, Quest Communications, Computer Associates, 
and Arthur Andersen. The collapse of Enron, at that time the largest bankruptcy in US 
history, led to thousands of employees losing their life savings tied up in the energy 
company‘s stock. This proved to be an unprecedented display of accounting fraud, regulatory 
failure, executive excess and avoidable bankruptcy, with resulting widespread disastrous 
losses incurred by employees‘ pension funds and investors. As a result, the US Congress 
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). This is a broad–based reform act centred on the 
creation of a public company accounting oversight board and the establishment of strict rules 
regarding auditor independence, corporate responsibility, financial disclosures, financial 
controls, analyst conflict of interest, white collar crime and corporate fraud (Banks, 2004). 
Denis and McConnell (2002) suggested that the ownership of publicly traded firms is 
significantly more concentrated in other countries than it is in the US. Private ownership 
concentration appears to have a positive effect on firm value. There are significant private 
benefits of control and they are more significant in most other countries than they are for the 
US. Structures that allow for control rights in excess of cash flow rights are common, and 
generally value-reducing. 
Solomon and Solomon‘s (2004) study of the case of Enron‘s downfall illustrates the 
importance of good corporate governance. They say that all the checks and balances within 
the corporate governance system have the ultimate aim of controlling and monitoring 
company management. Corporate governance mechanisms cannot prevent unethical activity 
by top management, but they can act as a means of detecting such activity. 
 
United Kingdom 
 
One of the earliest governance crises was the bursting of the South Sea Bubble of 1720-21 
which dramatically changed business habits and regulations in the UK. The UK rapidly 
enacted corporate statutes to protect the public from such abuses as the bubble scandal. The 
main elements included: shareholders‘ rights to information, and the ability to appoint and 
remove directors and auditors (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000). In the late 1980s financial 
scandals leading to the collapse of several prominent companies came to light in the UK. 
There was a strong private response alongside the public regulatory response. The corporate 
sector responded to the loss of confidence in financial reporting by setting up the Cadbury 
Committee in 1990 to develop a code of best practice (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000). 
In 1991, several large UK corporations collapsed, including Robert Maxwell MMC, BCCI 
and Polly Peck. As a result, one of the greatest proponents of active corporate governance, Sir 
Adrian Cadbury, chaired a commission and the Cadbury Report published by that 
commission in 1992 was to have considerable influence, not just in the UK but in many other 
countries around the world that adopted similar corporate governance codes of practice 
(Clarke, 2004). Solomon and Solomon (2004) stated that the Cadbury Report focused on the 
 
 
board of directors as the most important corporate governance mechanism, requiring constant 
monitoring and assessment. The accounting and auditing functions were also shown to play 
an essential role in good corporate governance, emphasising the importance of corporate 
transparency with shareholders and other stakeholders. Finally, Cadbury‘s focus on the 
importance of institutional investors as the largest and most influential group of shareholders 
has had a lasting impact. 
Further UK reforms of corporate governance followed the Cadbury Code (1992). The 
Greenbury Report (1995) proposed guidelines for director remuneration, the Hampel Report 
(1998) focused on disclosure and best practice, the Combined Code (1998) outlined a 
mandatory disclosure framework, and the Turnbull Report (1999) offered advice on 
compliance with mandatory disclosure (in Kiel, Kiel-Chisholm, and Nicholson, 2004). 
Australia 
The Australian corporate governance framework is characterised by a mix of legal regulation 
largely contained in the Corporations Act 2001 and common law principles and self-
regulation most notably set out in the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Listing Rules, 
which require disclosure of corporate governance practices. Studies of the Australian 
corporate governance regime indicated that the share market plays an important role and that 
share ownership tends to be relatively widely dispersed. Shareholders are generally prepared 
to be mobile in their investments and the market therefore plays an important role and 
directors have a strong incentive to act in the interests of shareholders and to enhance 
shareholder value (Keong, 2002). 
In Australia there were two major corporate collapses in the first decade of this century, HIH 
Insurance and OneTel. A round of reforms in the shape of the Australian Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program (CLERP 9) in 2002 quickly published a new series of 
requirements for companies registered in Australia (Clarke, 2004). Corporate governance is a 
major focus of the changes introduced in Australia. First, the CLERP 9 Bill, incorporated into 
the Corporations Act, provides further law concerning auditors, the use of accounting 
standards and the requirements of regulatory authorities such as the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA). Second, ‗Standards Australia‘ released guidance on corporate 
governance, ‗Good Governance Principles‘ (AS 8000-2003). This standard includes comment 
on board structure, director independence and the skills and experience represented on the 
board. Third, the ASX created the ASX Corporate Governance Council in 2002. 
In 2003, the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations 
(ASX guidelines) were released. The ASX guidelines were aimed at encouraging boards to 
think about and debate how effective corporate governance could be brought to their 
organisations. In 2004, the Implementation Review Group (IRG) was established to monitor 
the progress of companies in implementing the principles and recommendations (Kiel et al., 
2004). 
3.3  Corporate governance and the Asian financial crisis of 1997 
It is claimed that poor corporate governance was one of the major contributing factors to the 
building-up of vulnerabilities in the affected countries that finally led to the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997 (Alba, Clasessens & Djankov, 1998; Keong, 2002; Claessens, Djankov & 
Lang, 2000). The Asian financial crisis commenced in Thailand in 1997. Collapsing 
 
 
currencies, equity and property markets in East Asia in 1997-98 exposed underlying 
vulnerabilities both in governance structures and values. However, an international 
confidence crisis was fuelled by a growing realisation of the structural weaknesses of 
economies often governed by crony capitalism, poor accounting and auditing systems, and 
too close a relationship between business and the State. Given the systemic nature of the 
problems of corporate governance in East Asia, only a fundamental program of reform of 
institutions and practices, conducted in an energetic and committed manner over a 
considerable period of time, was considered likely to produce results. 
Khan (1999) analysed some basic issues related to reforming the corporate governance 
systems in post-crisis Asia. The thinness of both bond and equity markets in many Asian 
developing economies was identified as one problem. In addition, there are the problems of 
lack of, or weaknesses in, adequate regulatory structures, transparency and accountability. 
Johnson et al. (2000) present evidence that the weakness of legal institutions for corporate 
governance had an important effect on the extent of currency depreciations and stock market 
declines in the Asian crisis. They show that managerial agency problems can make countries 
with weak legal systems vulnerable to the effects of a sudden loss of investor confidence. 
They suggest that corporate governance, in general, and the de facto protection of minority 
shareholder rights, in particular, mattered a great deal for the extent of exchange rate 
depreciation and stock market decline in 1997-98. 
Iskander and Chamlou (2000) pointed out that the financial crisis in East Asia forced 
countries to take majors steps to strengthen governance. Moves included closing insolvent 
banks, strengthening prudential regulations, opening the banking sector to foreign investors, 
revamping bankruptcy and takeover rules, tightening listing rules, requiring companies to 
appoint external directors, introducing international accounting and auditing standards, 
requiring conglomerates to prepare consolidated accounts, and enacting fair trade laws. 
3.4  International models of corporate governance 
The experience of the Asian crisis that revealed a systemic failure in corporate governance 
was a spur to the publication by the OECD of the Principles of Corporate Governance. This 
framework of principles was endorsed by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the ADB. This framework of corporate governance principles was intended to 
have universal appeal, but there was some implication that they were essentially derived from 
the fundamentals of the market-based system, and that they were particularly aimed at the 
exponents of the insider systems with relationship-based approaches, especially in the 
developing economies where corporate governance failure was assumed to be more likely. 
The OECD initially identified five basic principles of corporate governance (Iskander & 
Chamlou, 2000). In April 2004, OECD governments accepted revised Principles covering six 
key areas of corporate governance: ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance 
framework; the rights of shareholders; the equitable treatment of shareholders; the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance; disclosure and transparency; and the responsibilities of 
the board (OECD, 2004). 
Corporate governance systems vary by country. The most prominent systems of corporate 
governance in developed countries are the US and UK models, which focus on dispersed 
controls, and the German and Japanese models, which reflect a more concentrated ownership 
structure (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000). The ADB (2000) investigated the corporate 
 
 
governance structures of the Asian crisis economies (ADB, 2000). The Bank analysed five 
individual countries, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, and found 
that the governance structures of the crisis economies closely resembled each other. 
Generally, the similar elements were: high ownership concentration; bank-centric financial 
systems; ineffective shareholders‘ rights laws; and low transparency. 
There are two general models of corporate governance. The first is a shareholder or equity 
market-based governance model of the Anglo-American style (EMS), under which a broader 
range of investors plays a role through the pricing, trading and buying of the firm‘s securities. 
The other model is a bank-led governance model (BLS), under which banks play the leading 
role in monitoring the firms. However, many researchers have suggested a mixture of the two 
models is appropriate for developing countries (Alba, Clasessens & Djankov, 1998; Keong, 
2002; Khan 2004). 
Family-based corporate governance system (FBS) 
Khan (2003) studied FBS in East Asia and stated that financing can come from three different 
sources. First, the FBS, especially in the initial stages of development of family businesses, 
could be financed internally for a large part. Second, as an enterprise grows over time, the 
role of banks becomes more prominent. Third, at some stage-perhaps overlapping with the 
second, i.e., bank financing – outside equity may become the most significant source of 
corporate finance. However, the key difference between FBS as a governance system and 
BLS and EMS lies in the fact that neither the banks nor the equity markets ultimately control 
the family business groups. Khan (2003) also indicated the ―historic mission‖ of the 
corporation as site of capital accumulation may require different types of governance 
structures under different historical conditions. In particular, in the East Asian context, the 
FBS structure has played an important role in the initial phase of capital accumulation in the 
East Asian countries. Indeed, its prevalence in Asian economies at all levels of development 
makes FBS almost a paradigmatic feature of corporate organisation and governance in Asia. 
Suchiro (1993; 1997) pointed out that one rationale for the FBS system is the flexibility in 
terms of the managerial decision-making process and efficiency in capital accumulation in 
the context of late-comer industrialisation. In Northeast Asia, some researchers have shown 
(Khan 1997; 1998) the period of catch-up growth has largely ended and global 
competitiveness must be increasingly based on organisational and product and technical 
innovations.  
A competing proposal is that the transition should be towards an EMS type of corporate 
governance. It should be recognised that the problems here are formidable. The thinness of 
both bond and equity markets is one problem. In addition, there are the usual problems of 
lack of adequate regulatory structures, transparency and accountability. In particular, the 
limited expertise and other institutional resources make the implementation of such proposals 
(which really should be self-enforcing) problematic (Khan, 2003). 
3.5  Agency theory 
It has been argued that the divorce of ownership and control has lead to the famous ‗agency 
problem‘. Berle and Means (1932) discussed the extent to which there was a dispersion of 
shareholding, which consequently led to a separation of ownership and control in the US. The 
agency problem was explored in Ross (1973), and the first detailed theoretical exposition of 
 
 
agency theory was presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976). They defined the managers of 
the company as the ‗agents‘ and the shareholders as the ‗principals‘. The problem is that the 
agents do not necessarily make decisions in the best interests of the principals (Solomon & 
Solomon, 2004). 
According to Hart (1995), corporate governance issues arise in an organisation wherever two 
conditions are present. First, when there is a conflict of interest or agency problem, involving 
members of the organisation, such as owners, managers, workers or customers. The second 
condition is when the problem cannot be dealt with through a contract. Hart observes that 
there are several reasons why contracting to overcome the agency problem might not always 
be possible. In particular, it is not possible to contract to cover all events. In addition, there 
are costs associated with negotiating contracts and enforcing them. 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) investigated the separation of ownership and control in 
2,980 publicly traded companies in nine East Asian countries. They found that single 
shareholders control more than two-thirds of firms. The separation of ownership and control 
is most pronounced among family-controlled firms and among small firms. They found that 
older firms are more likely to be family controlled, as are smaller firms. Claessens and Fan 
(2003) found that agency problems, arising from certain ownership structures, especially 
large deviations between control and cash flow rights, are anticipated and priced by investors. 
The nature of a corporation‘s ownership structure will affect the nature of the agency 
problems between managers and outside shareholders, and among shareholders. On the other 
hand, when ownership is concentrated to a degree that one owner has effective control of the 
firm, as is typically the case in Asia, the nature of the agency problem shifts away from 
manager-shareholder conflicts to conflicts between the controlling owner (who is often also 
the manager) and minority shareholders. 
3.6  Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory has developed gradually since the 1970s. One of the first expositions of 
stakeholder theory was presented by Freeman (1984), who proposed a general theory of the 
firm, incorporating corporate accountability to a broad range of stakeholders. Stakeholders 
include shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, communities in the vicinity 
of the company‘s operations and the general public (Solomon & Solomon, 2004). 
 
A basic issue for stakeholder theory is that companies are so large and their impact on society 
so pervasive that they should discharge accountability to many more sectors than solely their 
shareholders (Solomon & Solomon, 2004). Stakeholder theory has its origins in the social 
entity conception of a corporation. The modern corporation has a large scale and scope that 
requires distinctive professional management expertise and a great amount of capital 
investment. Through the stock markets, share ownership in a corporation becomes dispersed 
and fragmented and shareholders become more like investors than owners. Since corporations 
are involved in many aspects of social life and affect many people in both welfare and 
potential risks, a public corporation should be conscious of its social obligations such as 
fairness, social justice and protection of employees (Letza, Sun & Kirkbride, 2004). 
Agency theory is focused on shareholder rights and the separation of ownership from control. 
However, stakeholder theory further extends the purpose of the corporation from maximising 
 
 
shareholders‘ wealth to delivering wider outputs to a range of stakeholders and emphasises 
corporate efficiency in a social context (Letza, Sun & Kirkbride, 2004). 
3.7  Ownership structure 
Hansmann (1996) defined firm owners as persons having two formal rights that included the 
right to control the firm and the right to appropriate the firm profits. Jensen and Meckling 
(1998) defined ownership as possession of a decision right along with the right to alienate 
that right. Ownership and control are rarely completely separated within any firm. The 
controllers frequently have some degree of ownership of the equity of the firms they control; 
while some owners, by virtue of the size of their equity positions, effectively have some 
control over the firms they own. Thus, ownership structure is a potentially important element 
of corporate governance. The relationships between ownership, control, and firm value are 
more complicated than that, however. Ownership by a company‘s management, for example, 
can serve to better align managers‘ interests with those of the company‘s shareholders (Denis 
& McConnell, 2002). 
LaPorta et al. (1999) showed that a large fraction of public and private companies around the 
world are family-controlled and often follow a pyramidal ownership structure. The use of 
pyramidal ownership structures allows the family to exert control over a large network of 
companies. Family companies appear to be more prevalent in countries with weak minority 
shareholder protection. 
The US evidence of the effects of ownership structure on corporate decisions and on firm 
value includes Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Serves (1990) who 
found that the alignment effects of inside ownership dominate the entrenchment effects over 
some ranges of managerial ownership. Bertrand et al. (2004) found that larger families are 
associated with a larger number of smaller firms in the group and with somewhat deeper 
groups. These effects of family composition on group size and structure are stronger for 
groups where ultimate control has been transferred from the founder to descendants. They 
also found that group firms tend to overlap less along genealogical lines once the founder has 
left active management: different sons of the founder are less likely to jointly hold board 
positions in the same firm once the founder retires. They suggested that potential conflicts 
between family members lead to distortions in the organisation and governance of the groups 
once the founder has retired. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggested that the benefits from concentrated ownership are 
relatively larger in countries that are generally less developed, where property rights are not 
well defined and/or not well protected by judicial systems. La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and 
Shleifer (1999) confirmed this proposition empirically as they show that the ownership stakes 
of the top three shareholders of the largest listed corporations in a broad sample of countries 
around the world are associated with weak legal and institutional environments. They also 
investigated the issue of ultimate control. They traced the chain of ownership to find who has 
the most voting rights. They suggest that ownership and control can be separated to the 
benefit of the large shareholders. 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) found that older firms are more likely to be family 
controlled, as are smaller firms. In some countries a significant share of corporate assets rests 
in the hands of a small number of families. They also found that corporate control is typically 
 
 
enhanced by pyramid structures and cross-holdings among firms in all East Asian countries. 
They suggested that a re-examination of the relationship between ownership structure and 
corporate performance is needed. In most of the developing East Asian countries, wealth is 
very concentrated in the hands of a few families. Wealth concentration might have negatively 
affected the evolution of the legal and other institutional frameworks for corporate 
governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. 
Many researchers noted that owners often enhance their control rights through cross-
shareholdings and pyramidal structures.  The effect of the divergence between control and 
ownership comes at a price of reduced firm value (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; 
Claessens, et al., 2002). Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) also found that ownership of 
Thai public companies, as in other East Asian countries, is highly concentrated and family 
dominated. Other studies in East Asia have also found that corporate governance factors 
affect firm valuation (Mitton, 2002; Lins, 2003; Zhuang et al., 2000). 
High ownership concentration is typically both a symptom and a cause of weak corporate 
governance (Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000). Corporate governance ought to be a means 
for investors to monitor and control management when protection systems are weak (Alba, 
Clasessens & Djankov, 1998). The high concentration of ownership reduces the effectiveness 
of some important mechanisms of shareholder protection, such as the system of the board of 
directors, shareholder participation through voting during shareholder meetings, transparency 
and disclosure. 
4.0  Summary 
In 1997, the Asian financial crisis occurred. This crisis led to the collapse of many companies 
and to the introduction of corporate governance structures in developing Asian countries like 
Thailand. As a result, interest in corporate governance increased. Government, business, 
institutional investors, professional advisers, consultants and academics have all taken a 
closer interest in issues like corporate ownership structure, board structure and composition, 
directors‘ and officers‘ legal duties and chief executive officer‘s remuneration. Good 
corporate governance in listed companies is likely to increase confidence and trust in capital 
markets. 
One of the most important characteristics of the corporate sector in Thailand is the feature of 
family control over business operations. At the time of the 1997 financial crisis, Thai public 
companies were characterised by their large family ownership with family members and 
related-party shareholders as the controlling shareholders. Lack of transparency and the lack 
of solid information regarding financial transactions as a result of this structural feature 
appear to have been critical factors contributing to the Thai financial crisis (Alba, Claessens 
& Djankov, 1998). 
Corporate governance in Thailand is currently at a crossroads. Much of the relevant literature 
claims significant benefits from the implementation of corporate governance. Thus, corporate 
governance has received substantial interest from companies and regulators and is of concern 
to both the public sector and the private sector. The international corporate governance 
system assumes a separation of ownership and control, a questionable assumption in the Thai 
context. Since the Asian financial crisis, all listed companies, especially family-owned 
businesses, have made generally poor information disclosure about related-parties 
 
 
transactions. This could be improved as part of the move to promote and enhance corporate 
governance. Family owners should be more interested in working with outside shareholders 
to maximise firm value. 
Consideration should be given to the use of outside directors, a tool normally used in western 
cultures.  The purpose is that outside directors can help monitor management and family 
owners. However, Thai people are non-confrontational and group-orientated. Many boards 
become so-called ―rubber stamp‖ boards, not because directors are unaware or uninterested in 
their roles and duties but because they are being considerate and respectful of the owner‘s 
decisions (Limpaphayom et al. 2004). The use of outside board members can be a very 
powerful tool under a corporate governance system that recognises institutional and cultural 
differences. 
Cultural attitude is important to identify the root cause for legal tardiness in Asian countries 
where legal practices are considered a foreign element that is not part of Asian culture. Actual 
implementation of legal processes is mostly avoided and settlement outside the court is more 
popular. Corruption is another factor that does not ensure justice for those who need or 
warrant it. However, corruption has a long history in Thai culture, stretching over many 
centuries. The Thai aversion to confrontation inherent in any adversarial legal system means 
that parties prefer amicable settlement rather than litigation. 
The attitudes of directors need to improve concerning the awareness of the role of other 
stakeholders in the company. Independent directors are expected to take a leading role in 
preventing controlling owners abusing their power and pursuing their private interests. In 
future reforms the true independence of independent directors should be encouraged so that 
they can serve and protect the interests of a broader group of stakeholders. 
Agency problems arise when a person, as a public sector employee or official, is influenced 
by personal considerations (Boadi, 2000). In Thailand family businesses, such conflicts of 
interest can be difficult and damaging. After the financial crisis the Thai Constitution was 
amended to include provisions to prevent conflicts of interest between elected officials and 
big business, including an unprecedented bar on politicians holding shares in companies. 
Such provisions were seen as necessary to avoid repetition of the corruption in previous 
governments that greatly contributed to Thailand‘s 1997 financial collapse. 
Stakeholder theory is that companies are so large and their impact on society so pervasive 
that they should discharge accountability to many more sectors than solely their shareholders 
(Solomon & Solomon, 2004). If corporate governance in Thailand is to improve, outside 
directors and professional societies will be expected to play the leading roles, supplemented 
by efforts of financial supervisory agencies and the judiciary. Better governance would also 
result from improved internal corporate governance mechanisms and enhanced accounting, 
disclosure, and auditing standards (Limpaphayom & Connelly 2004). 
One useful framework of corporate governance reform is the structure, process, and strategy 
of the corporate governance system. The structure of the governance system is important. The 
structure outlines the rules: disclosure standards, laws and regulations, and the organisations 
charged with enforcement have a major influence on the effectiveness of any governance 
regime. In Thailand, the structure required to build good corporate governance practices is 
now largely in place. 
 
 
Finally, improvements to corporate governance could be initiated by many organisations, 
including government and educational institutions or universities. These organisations could 
help to improve corporate governance by strengthening rules and laws. They need to monitor 
enterprise management; further improve accounting practices and disclosure of information; 
improve enforcement of corporate governance regulations; encourage minority investors to 
monitor and discipline executives and protect minority investors; improve the framework for 
corporate governance and encourage public discussion on the issue; and, analyse data to 
monitor firms‘ performance. 
Overall, the review in this paper suggests that the Asian financial crisis forced companies to 
improve corporate governance. Variables identified in the literature such as the roles of the 
board of directors, audit committee, shareholder rights, and disclosure and transparency could 
be monitored and controlled by regulation to achieve a satisfactory standard or benchmark for 
corporate governance when compared with western models. 
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